The Court of Appeal's Hohepa Wi Neera judgment is therefore a very interesting focus on the workings of senior elements of the New Zealand judiciary at a time when they saw the New Zealand settlement of native title, as enshrined in Wi Parata, under significant threat from an imperial Court. It is the argument of this paper that the response of the New Zealand Court of Appeal to this threat indicated the presence of a "colonial consciousness" on their part, where their primary concern was to evade the Privy Council ruling and defend the legal settlement on native title which they saw as most conducive to settler interests, even at the expense of an open breach with the Privy Council.
I HOHEPA WI NEERA IN CONTEXT
Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington was a native title case concerning the same land, under the same grant, that the Court had adjudicated on the previous year in Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington. 11 However unlike that previous case, it was adjudicated upon by the Court of Appeal in full knowledge of the Privy Council's recent ruling on native title in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1900-01) . Although the Privy Council had delivered that judgment prior to the Court of Appeal ruling in Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington (1901) , nevertheless the decision had not reached the Court of Appeal in time for it to influence their decision in that case. 12 Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington was therefore the first New Zealand case to adjudicate on native title in full knowledge of the Privy Council's decision.
But why is this significant? The answer lies in the extent to which the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker broke from established New Zealand precedent on native title and thereby redefined the judicial landscape in relation to it. As mentioned above, the reigning New Zealand precedent on native title up to that time was the New Zealand Supreme Court judgment of Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1878). In that case, Prendergast CJ had resolved the native title issue in the interests of the Crown and settler society by insisting that native title matters involving the Crown were entirely a matter for the prerogative powers of the Crown, and were therefore outside the jurisdiction of the municipal courts. 13 Prendergast CJ held that a mere declaration by the 13 Prendergast CJ identified native title matters with the prerogative powers of the Crown by insisting that Crown responsibilities regarding native title were akin to treaty obligations, and therefore any actions of the Crown arising from these responsibilities were acts of state, and for that reason, outside the jurisdiction of
Crown that native title was extinguished on any particular piece of land was sufficient indication of the exercise of that prerogative and therefore conclusive on the Courts. 14 The result, according to Prendergast CJ, was that no native title claim could prevail against the Crown, unless the Crown itself wished the claim to succeed, thereby ensuring that all Crown titles were safe from unwanted legal challenge in this respect. 15 Such a ruling was clearly in the interests of the Crown and the settlers who held Crown titles. Prendergast CJ had asserted that the Crown could unilaterally conclude any native title claim, simply by declaring that the native title had indeed been lawfully extinguished, and Maori had no recourse to judicial appeal against such a declaration because, native title matters involving the Crown falling within the latter's prerogative powers, the Crown was the "sole arbiter of its own justice". 16 One could not imagine a precedent more conducive to providing stability and security to settler interests in the colonizing process, at the expense of those Maori tribes whose land was now subject to that colonization. the courts. As Prendergast CJ put it, the Crown's duty of protecting the Maori tribes from "… any infringement of their right of occupancy … although not to be regarded as properly a treaty obligation, is yet in the nature of a treaty obligation. It is one, therefore, with the discharge of which no other power in the State can pretend to interfere. The exercise of the right and the discharge of the correlative duty, constitute an extraordinary branch of the prerogative, wherein the sovereign represents the entire body-politic, and not, as in the case of ordinary prerogative, merely the Supreme Executive power." (Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 78-79). Prendergast CJ therefore concludes: "Transactions with the natives for the cession of their title to the Crown are thus to be regarded as acts of State, and therefore are not examinable by any Court … Especially it cannot be questioned, but must be assumed, that the sovereign power has properly discharged its obligations to respect, and cause to be respected, all native proprietary rights." (Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 79). Paul McHugh has criticised Prendergast CJ's conclusion that the Crown's dealings with Maori over native title were "acts of State", on the following grounds: "By 1877 the Maori's status as British subjects had been long fixed -how then could an 'act of state' be made by the Crown against its own subjects?" (Paul McHugh, "Aboriginal Title in New Zealand Courts" (1894) 2 Canterbury LR 247 ["Aboriginal Title in New Zealand Courts"]. McHugh points out that a long line of judicial authority had established "… that as between the sovereign and a subject there can be no act of State on British territory…." ("Aboriginal Title in New Zealand Courts", 247 n 55). See also, The Maori Magna Carta, above n 10, 114.
14 As Prendergast CJ put it: "In this country the issue of a Crown grant undoubtedly implies a declaration by the Crown that the native title over the land which it comprises has been extinguished. For the reason we have given, this implied fact is one not to be questioned in any Court of Justice, unless indeed the Crown should itself desire to question it, and should call upon the Court to lend its aid in correcting some admitted mistake. 
II THE PRIVY COUNCIL DEPARTURE FROM WI PARATA
It is in this context that the impact of the Privy Council's departure from the Wi Parata precedent in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker must be understood. In departing from Wi Parata, the Privy Council was producing nothing less than a fundamental upheaval in the New Zealand legal landscape concerning issues of land settlement. The fact that, as we shall see below, the Privy Council's departure from Wi Parata was only partial, leaving some primary elements of the judgment intact, only heightens the significance of the New Zealand judicial response. Any suggestion that the Wi Parata precedent was in question, no matter how partial, was sufficient to arouse the concern of the New Zealand Bench, given the centrality of this precedent to land title and land settlement in New Zealand. 17 In Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, the Privy Council considered an appeal against a New Zealand Court of Appeal decision of the same name, decided in 1894. The 1894 case involved a claim by the plaintiff that land which the Crown had put up for sale belonged to him either under a Native Land Court order of 1871, or on the basis of native title. 18 The Court of Appeal held that the former basis for title was void, and so the case proceeded on the assumption that the plaintiff was asserting a "pure Maori title" to the land. 19 The two questions which therefore arose for adjudication in the 1894 case were: 20 (1)
Can the interest of the Crown in the subject-matter of this suit be attacked by this proceeding?
(2) Has the Court jurisdiction to inquire whether, as a matter of fact, the land in dispute herein has been ceded by the Native owners to the Crown?
The Court of Appeal answered both questions in the negative, upholding the principle of Wi Parata that native title matters involving the Crown fell entirely within the Crown's prerogative powers, and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Courts, so that the Crown was the sole determinant of justice in the matter. As Richmond J, delivering the judgment of the Court, put it: 21 The plaintiff comes here … on a pure Maori title, and the case is within the direct authority of Wi Parata 18 See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 487-488 (CA).
19 See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 488 (CA) Richmond J.
20 Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 485 (CA).
21 Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 488 Richmond J (CA).
which the validity of dealings in the name and under the authority of the Sovereign with the Native tribes of this country for the extinction of their territorial rights can be tested. Such transactions began with the settlement of these Islands; so that Native custom is inapplicable to them. The Crown is under a solemn engagement to observe strict justice in the matter, but of necessity it must be left to the conscience of the Crown to determine what is justice. The security of all titles in the country depends on the maintenance of this principle.
The plaintiff appealed to the Privy Council against this decision, and the same two questions arose for adjudication. The Privy Council reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal on the second question, finding that the Courts do have jurisdiction "… to inquire whether as a matter of fact the land in dispute has been ceded by the native owners to the Crown in accordance with law…" 22 It did so on the basis of finding that the Native Rights Act 1865, was a clear statutory recognition of the legal existence of native title in New Zealand, and its justiciability in the Courts. 23 However, the Privy Council reserved judgment on the first question, insisting that the issue of the Crown's prerogative powers, which according to Wi Parata barred any legal challenge on native title matters involving the Crown, did not arise in this case. 24 Rather, as we shall see below, the Privy Council held that any authority exercised by the Crown officers in this case was exercised under statutory authority, rather than the prerogative, and so that authority was justiciable in the Courts. 25 Consequently, the Privy Council's overturning of the Wi Parata precedent in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker was only partial. It insisted that native title fell within the jurisdiction of the Courts, but on a statutory basis -the Native Rights Act 1865. Yet it reserved judgment on whether native title would still fall within the jurisdiction of the Courts if the Crown's prerogative powers were involved -that is, the very principle which was central to Wi Parata. Further, the Privy Council actually affirmed the final ruling of Prendergast CJ regarding the facts of the case in Wi Parata, including the ruling that the existence of a Crown grant was sufficient declaration by the Crown that the native title had been lawfully extinguished. 26 It simply disagreed with some of his wider obiter dicta on native title. 23 Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 382-83 (PC).
24 As Lord Davey put it, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council: "Their Lordships … express no opinion on the question which was mooted in the course of the argument whether the Native title could be extinguished by the exercise of the prerogative, which does not arise in the present case." (Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 385 (PC)).
25 See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 380-81 (PC).
26 As Lord Davey stated: "In the case of Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington, already referred to, the decision was that the Court has no jurisdiction by scire facias or other proceeding to annul a Crown grant for matter not appearing on the face of it, and it was held that the issue of a Crown grant implies a declaration by the Crown that the Native title has been extinguished … But the dicta in the case go beyond what was necessary for the decision … As applied to the case then before the Court however, their
This disagreement was based in particular on Prendergast CJ's initial denial of the very existence of native title, embodied in Maori customary law. 27 However despite these criticisms of Prendergast CJ's judgment, we have seen that the Privy Council stopped short of challenging the central doctrine of the Wi Parata precedent -that native title matters involving the Crown were subject to the Crown's prerogative powers, and so outside the jurisdiction of the Courts. The Privy Council therefore overturned the 1894 decision of the Court of Appeal, and its defence of Wi Parata, by holding that in this particular case, the native title matters Lordships see no reason to doubt the correctness of the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges." (Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 383-84 (PC)).
27 Hence at one point in his Wi Parata judgment, Prendergast CJ went so far as to assert a terra nullius position that native title did not exist, on the grounds that there was no Maori customary law to sustain it. For instance, after referring to the New South Wales Act, 4 Vict 7, and the Land Claims Ordinance 1841, Prendergast states: "… these measures were avowedly framed upon the assumption that there existed amongst the natives no regular system of territorial rights nor any definite ideas of property in land …" (Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 77). Later in his judgment he criticises the reference in the Native Rights Act 1865 to the "Ancient Custom and Usage of the Maori People", "… as if some such body of customary law did in reality exist. But a phrase in a statute cannot call what is non-existent into being. As we have shown, the proceedings of the British Government and the legislation of the colony have at all times been practically based on the contrary supposition, that no such body of law existed; and herein have been in entire accordance with good sense and indubitable facts." (Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 79). Such a position was clearly at odds with Prendergast CJ's insistence elsewhere in his judgment that native title did indeed exist, but was subject to the prerogative powers of the Crown. Subsequent judicial authority upheld this latter position as the authoritative precedent on Wi Parata and tended to ignore the former terra nullius position (see Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7 (CA); Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3; Tate, above n 7.)
28 Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 382-83 (PC).
involving the Crown did fall within the Court's jurisdiction, but only on the assumption that the question of the Crown's prerogative over native title did not arise: 29
Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that the order of the Court of Appeal should be reversed, and a declaration should be made in answer to the third and fourth issues of law as follows: That it not appearing that the estate and interest of the Crown in the subject-matter of this suit subject to such Native titles (if any) as have not been extinguished in accordance with law is being attacked by this proceeding, the Court has jurisdiction to inquire whether as a matter of fact the land in dispute has been ceded by the Native owners to the Crown in accordance with law…
III IMPACT ON WI PARATA
Nevertheless, despite these qualifications, the Privy Council's judgment was a significant departure from the Wi Parata precedent. This was due to the identity of the respondent in the case. The respondent was a senior Crown official -the Commissioner of Crown Lands for the Wellington District. 30 It was his authority to sell the lands in accordance with the Land Act, 1892, which was being challenged by the appellant in this case. The appellant insisted that part of the lands proposed for sale by the Land Commissioner were lands upon which the native title had not been extinguished. 31 The Land Commissioner insisted, on the basis of Wi Parata, that because native title claims involving the Crown were a matter for the Crown's prerogative, the Courts had no jurisdiction to determine this claim, and the declaration of the Crown was conclusive on the matter. 32 As we have seen, the New Zealand Court of Appeal had agreed with this latter position, 29 Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 385 (PC).
30 See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 483 (CA). At one point, the defendants also included the AttorneyGeneral for New Zealand. In the facts of the case outlined in the 1894 judgment, the Court of Appeal stated: "The plaintiff took out a summons for leave to join the Attorney-General as a defendant, and, on the order being made for the argument of questions of law, it was agreed between the parties that, if the Court was of opinion that the Attorney-General was a necessary party, the questions should be dealt with as if he had been made a party, and had raised all the defences raised by the defendant." (Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 485 (CA)). The Court of Appeal held that the Attorney-General was a necessary party to the case, stating: "In our opinion, the Attorney-General is a necessary party to this suit, and, that being so, he is by consent to be considered as a defendant ..." (Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 487 (CA)). However the Privy Council rejected this ruling on appeal, stating: "The Court of Appeal thought that the AttorneyGeneral was a necessary party to the action, but it follows from what their Lordships have said as to the character of the action that in their opinion he was neither a necessary nor a proper party." (Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 381 (PC)).
31 See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 483 (CA). So the Privy Council ruled in favour of the appellant and his native title claims, and against the Commissioner of Crown Lands, solely in terms of the Commissioner's statutory powers, thereby reserving judgment on the extent to which the Crown still retained prerogative powers over native title. 35 (1) of the Act then proceeded to protect the Crown from any native title claims which the Crown itself did not wish to entertain: "In the case of Native land or land acquired from Natives, the validity of any order of the Native Land Court, Crown grant, or other instrument of title purporting to have been issued under the authority of law which has subsisted for not less than ten years prior to the passing of this Act shall not be called in question in any Court, or be the subject of any order of the Chief Judge of the Native Land Court … unless with the consent of the Governor in Council first had and obtained; and in the absence of such consent this Act shall be an absolute bar to the initiation of any proceedings in any Court calling in question the validity of any such order, Crown grant or instrument of title, or the jurisdiction of the Native Land Court to make any such order, or the power of the Governor to make and issue any such Crown grant." Consequently, the Land ruling meant that Prendergast CJ's conclusion that the Crown was the "sole arbiter of its own justice" on native title issues no longer held. The actions of Crown officials, relating to the extinguishment of native title, could now be adjudicated upon by the Courts, so long as the Court found that the Crown officials were not exercising the prerogative powers of the Crown, but rather were acting under statutory authority. Whether they were acting under Crown or statutory authority was clearly an open question, given that the Court of Appeal had ruled in 1894 that the Land Commissioner was exercising the Crown's prerogative powers, and the Privy Council had ruled seven years later that he was not.
In other words, the central platform of the Wi Parata precedent, and of the land settlement process in New Zealand -that native title matters involving the Crown fell exclusively within the prerogative powers of the Crown and so outside the jurisdiction of the Courts -was looking extremely shaky. Despite the fact that the Privy Council had denied it was challenging those prerogative powers, in practical terms the outcome of their judgment was to establish a precedent that native title matters involving the Crown could be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in specified circumstances. 37 The authority of the Wi Parata precedent to protect the land settlement process in New Zealand from native title challenge had therefore been broken. From a settler perspective therefore, the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker had rendered the land settlement process in New Zealand subject to uncertainty and insecurity. 
B Stout CJ and the Recognition of Native Title
Chief Justice Stout began his judgment in Hohepa Wi Neera with an attempt to firmly establish the legal basis of native title within New Zealand law. He began by referring to chapter xii, section 9 of the Imperial Instructions of 1846 which, he says, allows land claims of aboriginal inhabitants to be admitted to prospective statutory land courts (as distinct from municipal courts) if "… the claimants or their progenitors or those from whom they derived title had actually had the occupation of the lands so claimed, and had been accustomed to use and enjoy the same either as places of abode, or for tillage, or for the growth of crops, or for the depasturing of cattle, or otherwise for the convenience and sustentation of life by means of labour expended thereon." 45 He also points to the Native Rights Act of 1865 with its reference to "… titles to land held under Maori custom and usage …". 46 The latter seems to amount to a clear admission, on the part of Stout CJ, of the statutory recognition of customary occupation and use of land as a legitimate basis for land title among the Maori population. In other words, in addition to the 1846 Instructions, it appears to be an effective recognition of native title, and to this extent, clearly departs from those elements of Prendergast CJ's judgment in Wi Parata which, at some points, had denied the very existence of such title. 47 Stout CJ then points to the establishment of statutory procedures for the investigation of native title, beginning in 1862, and involving the establishment of a Native Land Court in 1865. He states: "There has since 1865 ever been a Native Land Court to investigate Native title; and the uniform rule has been, until such investigation was determined the Supreme Court did not recognise the title of any Native to sue for possession of land uninvestigated by the [Land] Court." 48 While this moves in the direction of the Wi Parata principle that native title, in and of itself, lies outside the jurisdiction of the municipal courts, it is not a denial of the existence of native title. Indeed, it is precisely such title that the statutory Land Court was established to investigate. is an implicit recognition of native title, since in the absence of native title, all land would be demesne lands of the Crown, until ceded by grant to settlers. 50 As we have seen, although at some points within the Wi Parata judgment, Prendergast CJ had articulated what seemed to be a terra nullius doctrine by denying the existence of native title altogether, at other points he fully affirmed the existence of native title but confined it within the prerogative powers of the Crown, thereby denying the municipal courts any jurisdiction to investigate native title in and of itself. 51 It is this second aspect of the Wi Parata precedent which 50 This was the inevitable conclusion of the terra nullius doctrine, which applied in the absence of native title.
This doctrine held that upon the acquisition of sovereignty over newly discovered territory, the Crown acquired all land as demesne lands of the Crown. This doctrine was asserted by the defence in the Mabo case. Justice Brennan articulated their position, for the sake of exposition, as follows: "On analysis, the defendant's argument is that, when the territory of a settled colony became part of the Crown's dominions, the law of England so far as applicable to colonial conditions became the law of the colony and, by that law, the Crown acquired the absolute beneficial ownership of all land in the territory so that the colony became the Crown's demesne and no right or interest in any land in the territory could thereafter be possessed by any other person unless granted by the Crown. was upheld by subsequent New Zealand judicial decisions on native title. 52 The question therefore arises of how far Stout CJ, and his brother judge, Williams J, moved beyond this precedent in Hohepa Wi Neera.
C The Impact of Nireaha Tamaki v Baker
As we have seen, the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker departed from the Wi Parata precedent by insisting that native title issues involving Maori and the executive government did fall within the jurisdiction of the municipal courts, to the extent that they fell within the scope of statutory authority, although it reserved judgment on issues of Crown prerogative. As discussed above, despite this qualification, the Privy Council decision was still understood in New Zealand as a threat to the Wi Parata precedent, because it meant that the Crown could now be subject to native title challenge in the Courts.
In Nireaha Tamaki, the Privy Council further departed from the Wi Parata precedent in their interpretation of the Native Rights Act 1865. In Wi Parata, Prendergast CJ had insisted that the legislature had not intended that the Crown be bound by the Native Rights Act 1865, because the Crown was not specifically mentioned in the Act. 53 He therefore ruled that the Crown could not be ordered by the Supreme Court to appear before the statutory Native Land Court in order to have native title matters determined under the terms of the Act. 54 Yet this was the very Act which the Privy Council relied on in Nireaha Tamaki to bind the Crown by holding that the Supreme Court could order that native title matters involving the Crown be referred for determination to that same statutory Court. As Lord Davey put it: 55
By section 5 it is plainly contemplated that cases might arise in the Supreme Court in which the title or some interest in Native land is involved, and in that case provision is made for the investigation of such titles and the ascertainment of such interests being remitted to a Court specifically constituted for the 
D Stout CJ's Reponse
The Privy Council's interpretation of the Native Rights Act was clearly perceived by Stout CJ as another threat to the Wi Parata precedent, and the established system of land settlement in New Zealand. In particular, Lord Davey's statement above implied that the Supreme Court could take cognizance of native title matters, in and of themselves, before the Native Land Court had converted such native title to a freehold title. Indeed, the Privy Council had concluded that the Supreme Court itself "… has jurisdiction to inquire whether as a matter of fact the land in dispute has been ceded by the Native owners to the Crown in accordance with law. ..." 57 However, according to Stout CJ, the settled principle in New Zealand was the contrary one -that the Supreme Court had no such jurisdiction, and could not recognise native title claims to land, being able only to recognise the freehold certificate that the Native Land Court issued in conversion of the native title to freehold title. As Stout CJ put it: 58
There has since 1865 ever been a Native Land Court to investigate Native title; and the uniform rule has been, until such investigation was determined the Supreme Court did not recognise the title of any However, in pointing in the passage above to the established New Zealand precedent that the Courts could only recognise land titles deriving from the Crown and therefore could not recognise native title, it does not appear that Stout CJ was asserting this in an attempt to overrule the Privy Council judgment. Rather, he makes this point in the context of his wider exposition of New Zealand law on native title, and points out in the passage above that it was believed to be "a true declaration of the law", "at all events up to the decision of Tamaki v Baker". In other words, far from attempting to overturn the new Privy Council judgment by asserting a contrary New Zealand one, Stout CJ was merely pointing to the extent to which the Privy Council judgment, in allowing the municipal courts to take cognisance of native title (a form of title which does not derive from the Crown) departed from established law and practice in New Zealand. 59 Stout CJ also communicated what he believed was the legal uncertainty produced by the Privy Council in its Nireaha Tamaki judgment by emphasising the extent to which he believed the Privy Council's interpretation of the Native Rights Act 1865 in that judgment departed from that of all reputable legal authority in New Zealand, including those who enacted it: 60
The interpretation of the Native Rights Act given by the Privy Council may have an effect not dreamed of by the Legislature that passed it, nor understood by the Judges of the Supreme Court since it was enacted.
As we saw, the Privy Council ruled in Nireaha Tamaki that the Native Rights Act bound the Crown and placed it within the jurisdiction of the Courts on native title matters when the actions of the Crown had a statutory basis. Stout CJ goes so far as to reject the Privy Council's interpretation of the Native Rights Act, and reasserts the Wi Parata view that the Crown is not bound by this statute. As he states: 61 I may further point out that so far as the Native Rights Act is concerned it could not bind the Crown.
Our 'Interpretation Act, 1888' is very explicit. It says that no Act must be read 'in any manner or way whatsoever to affect the rights of the Crown unless it is expressly stated therein that the Crown is bound thereby' … I mention these facts, as they are not referred to in the judgment of Tamaki v Baker, and the Privy Council does not seem to have been informed of the circumstances of the colony when -and for many years afterwards -the Act was passed.
59 Native title was the one form of land title which was held not to derive from the Crown. Rather, in so far as it was based on customary native ownership, native title was held to precede the Crown, and its acquisition of sovereignty, and to become a "burden" on the Crown's radical title once that sovereignty was acquired. 
V THE COURT OF APPEAL'S BROADER STRATEGY
So we see therefore that Stout CJ critically confronted the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker at a number of points. Yet with the exception of the last criticism above concerning the interpretation of the Native Rights Act 1865, these critical confrontations did not lead to a reassertion of the principles of Wi Parata over and above those of the Privy Council. Much of Stout CJ's argument above was a reflection on the extent to which the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki had departed from New Zealand precedent and the uncertainty this would produce. As such, it was not really central to the Court of Appeal in reaching its conclusions in the Hohepa Wi Neera case.
What was central was what I call the Court of Appeal's "broader strategy" in Hohepa Wi Neera. It was this strategy that allowed it to reach its final conclusions in the case, crucial to which was a ruling that, despite the wider criticisms of the Privy Council, central elements of Wi Parata could still be applied as authoritative precedent in Hohepa Wi Neera. Such a result could only be achieved by Stout CJ, and his brother judge Williams J (with one or the other of whom the rest of the Court concurred) through their adoption of a more subtle defence of Wi Parata than the articulation of its open differences from Nireaha Tamaki espoused by Stout CJ above. A deeper reading of the separate judgments of each of these figures reveals this "broader strategy" in action. Rather than confronting the Privy Council decision head-on, disputing its claims and effectively placing itself in clear opposition to the ruling of a superior court, this broader strategy attempted to minimise the impact of the Privy Council's departure from Wi Parata, either by insisting that the Privy Council's decision was not a significant departure from Wi Parata (Stout), or by insisting that the Privy Council's decision was not directly relevant to the facts of the present case (Williams).
As we have seen, the facts of the present case were almost identical to those that confronted Prendergast CJ and Richmond J in Wi Parata. 62 The main difference between Prendergast CJ and Richmond J's deliberation on these facts in 1877, and the Court of Appeal's deliberation in the present case, was that the Court of Appeal was now faced with a Privy Council decision which departed significantly from the Wi Parata precedent at various points, and so mitigated against a direct application of Wi Parata to the present case. Consequently, a basic feature of the Court of Appeal's judgment in Hohepa Wi Neera was an attempt to circumvent this inconvenient 62 The basis upon which the plaintiff attempted to impeach the Crown's grant to the Bishop of New Zealand in Hohepa Wi Neera was "… that the land has never been legally ceded to the Crown, that the Crown grant of the land in 1850 to the Bishop of New Zealand … was null and void, and that the land was still Native land, the property according to Native custom of the successors of those who were so entitled in 1848 . 
A Stout CJ's Strategy
Although Stout CJ does not say so in so many words, it is clear that his strategy for minimising the impact of Nireaha Tamaki v Baker on the Wi Parata precedent was to minimise the extent to which the Privy Council's decision was perceived as departing from that precedent. As mentioned earlier, although the Privy Council criticised significant elements of Prendergast CJ's obiter dicta on native title in Wi Parata, and moved against the spirit of that judgment by insisting that the Crown officials dealing with native title were exercising statutory authority and so were subject to the jurisdiction of the municipal courts, it actually affirmed the conclusions Prendergast CJ arrived at in his Wi Parata judgment, in particular, his claim that a Crown grant be taken as conclusive evidence that the native title had been extinguished. 63 Stout CJ therefore insisted that the present case once again involved these same legal questions, and so the conclusions of Wi Parata could once again be directly applied to it, irrespective of the Privy Council's criticism of the wider obiter dicta in that case. As Stout CJ put it: 64
It does not, however, seem to me necessary to inquire how far the decision in Tamaki Now as we have seen, in his protest the following year, Stout CJ made clear the extent to which he believed the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker was a threat to the stability and security of land settlement in New Zealand. 65 He perceived this decision to be a threat precisely because of the extent to which it departed from the Wi Parata precedent. Yet in the passage above, Stout CJ adopted the opposite tack, minimising the extent to which the Privy Council's decision could be seen as a departure from Wi Parata. In so doing, he minimised the wider implications of that departure by insisting that, because the Privy Council had ruled that Wi Parata had been rightly decided on the facts, and those facts were the same in the present case, its wider criticisms of Wi Parata were irrelevant to the case at hand. The result was that the Privy Council's decision did not prevent the direct application of the conclusions of Wi Parata to the present case. Hence by minimising the Privy Council's departure from Wi Parata, Stout CJ was able to claim that the latter was still the authoritative precedent to be applied, at least to the facts before him.
B Williams J's Strategy
Williams J's strategy for minimising the impact of Nireaha Tamaki Williams J does not challenge these Privy Council findings in any way, even though they clearly depart from the direction which the Court of Appeal had followed since Wi Parata, particularly concerning the extent to which the Crown is immune from native title challenge due to the existence of its prerogative. However what Williams J does do is to argue that none of the above Privy Council conclusions are applicable to the present case, because the facts informing the present case occurred at a time prior to the enactment of the statutes (in particular, the Native Rights Act 1865) upon which the Privy Council relied in coming to its conclusions on native title. As Williams J states: 68
In the present case, however, we have to deal with transactions which took place before New Zealand became a self-governing colony, and long before the statutes now regulating the rights of Natives and the ascertainment of title to and the disposition of Native lands were in existence … There were no statutes regulating the acquisition of Native rights of occupancy by the Crown, whether by purchase, gift from the natives, or otherwise. If the question arose in any particular case whether Native rights had been ceded to the Crown, it must have been for the Governor of the colony, the only channel through which in a Crown colony the cession could have been made, to say whether they had been ceded or not,
Therefore, by insisting that the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker had relied on statutes regulating native title which were enacted after the circumstances which gave rise to the present case, Williams J was able to minimise the applicability of this Privy Council decision to the facts before him. He was therefore able to follow Stout CJ in affirming the continuing relevance of Wi Parata to the present case 
C The Final Ruling in Hohepa Wi Neera
The judgment for the defendant in Hohepa Wi Neera largely rested on the Court's response to the following questions stated for argument in the case: 73 Williams J (Denniston J concurring) agreed with Stout CJ, again citing Wi Parata as the authoritative precedent. 74 The plaintiff's claim that the Crown grant could be annulled, and the land returned to the original owners, on the grounds that the pre-existing native title had not been lawfully extinguished, was therefore denied.
VI DID NIREAHA TAMAKI MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Yet despite the attempts of the Court of Appeal in Hohepa Wi Neera to minimise the impact of Nireaha Tamaki on the Wi Parata precedent, did the Privy Council decision make a difference to the way in which the New Zealand Court of Appeal now approached the issue of native title? I think so. The extent of the difference can be seen in the fact that, although the facts of the case in Hohepa Wi Neera were virtually identical to those which arose in Wi Parata, the judges in Hohepa Wi Neera adjudicated on them in a very different manner to the way in which they were dealt with in that former case. Wellington is a decision on the main points raised in this case, and ought to be decisive of issues 6, 7, and 8." (Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 667 Stout CJ).
74 As Williams J said: "On the authority, therefore, of Wi Parata's case, and upon general principles, I think that our judgment should be for the defendants, and that the answers to the questions stated in the case should be those suggested by His Honour." (Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 672 Williams J).
The very manner in which both Stout CJ and Williams J adjudicated in Hohepa Wi Neera reveals the profound difference which the Privy Council's judgment in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker had made to the New Zealand judicial environment on native title. One of the central strategies of Prendergast CJ when confronted with the same facts as the present case some twenty-five years before, was to simply deny the Court's jurisdiction over the matter, on the grounds that native title issues involving the Crown involved acts of State and so fell within the confines of the Crown prerogative. 75 At one point he even admitted he was interpreting a statute to exclude the Crown precisely because any other interpretation would deny that prerogative. 76 Despite facing essentially the same facts in the present case, the Court of Appeal did not resort to this strategy, even though the Court of Appeal's obiter dicta in Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington the previous year seemed to provide some support for doing so. 77 Rather than simply accepting the Crown's declarations concerning native title as binding on the Court, as the Wi Parata precedent would require, the judges in Hohepa Wi Neera weighed the evidence for the Crown against that for the plaintiff before reaching a conclusion. 78 Hohepa Wi Neera therefore showed that the Court of 77 In Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, the Court of Appeal delivered obiter dicta on an amended statement of defence submitted by the Solicitor-General which strongly suggested that, had it been necessary to adjudicate on the issue, they would have given strong support to the principle that the Court has no jurisdiction over native title matters involving Maori tribes and the Crown. As Justice Williams put it: "The position appears to be somewhat as follows … The Crown … as parens patriae, is under a solemn obligation to protect the rights of Native owners of the soil. When, therefore, the Crown, as parens patriae, asserts that in that capacity it is under an obligation to Natives in respect of a property, can this Court, representing the Crown as parens patriae, say to the Crown, You shall not carry out this obligation …? We see great difficulty in holding that, in such circumstances, the Court could or ought to interfere." (SolicitorGeneral v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3, 686 Williams J). He adds further: "[T]he Crown therefore asserts that it has duties towards the Natives who ceded the land which could not be performed if the Court administered the trust cy-près. This would place the Court in a considerable difficulty. What the original rights of the Native owners were, what the bargain was between the Natives and the Crown when the Natives ceded the land, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for this Court to inquire into, even if it were clear that it had jurisdiction to do so." (Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3, 686 Williams J).
78 Consequently, even though Williams J follows his line of reasoning above that in the absence of statutes regulating the extinguishment of native title, a Crown grant must be considered conclusive evidence of such extinguishment, nevertheless this is still an instance of a municipal court weighing the Crown's evidence against those of other parties (rather than denying the Court's jurisdiction in the face of declarations by the Crown). Hence Williams J's conclusion is as follows: "I think the issue of the Crown grant in 1850 is conclusive evidence that any native rights then existing in the land had been ceded to the Crown, and that the cession had been accepted by the Crown. The execution of such an instrument by the only officer who could accept a cession on behalf of the Crown necessarily implies that there has been a cession and that the Crown has accepted it." (Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 671 Williams J 
VII COLONIAL CONSCIOUSNESS
We can therefore see a clear strategy at work in the judgments of Stout CJ and Williams J in Hohepa Wi Neera. Faced with a new Privy Council decision on native title which effectively overturned much of the Wi Parata precedent -a precedent which had provided the framework for New Zealand judicial reflection on native title for so long -both judges adopted strategies aimed at minimizing the relevance of this precedent to their deliberations in the present case. In so doing, they were able to retain their allegiance to Wi Parata by insisting on its continuing relevance to the facts before them.
But why would both judges go to such lengths to maintain the authority of Wi Parata in the face of Privy Council challenge? Why would they adopt strategies whose apparent purpose was to circumvent the judgment of a superior Court, at least in so far as that judgment related to the facts of the case before them? At the most immediate level, the answer lies in the material security which Wi Parata provided both for the Crown and for settler society in New Zealand. As we have seen, Wi Parata ensured that the land settlement process in New Zealand was entirely free from legal challenge by Maori tribes on the basis of native title. As we have seen, the centrality of this precedent to the stability and security of land tenure in New Zealand is demonstrated by the fact that senior New Zealand judges (including Stout CJ) insisted that any departure from it would produce instability and insecurity. 86 Consequently, against this broader background, we can understand the judgments of Stout CJ and Williams J in Hohepa Wi Neera as informed by a desire to defend what they saw as necessary for the stability and security of land settlement in New Zealand. Such a position was clearly partial to settler over Maori interests, because this stability and security required the maintenance of a precedent which denied Maori any legal grounds for asserting native title claims against the Crown.
suggestion by the Crown that native title matters fall outside the jurisdiction of the Courts, due to the Crown prerogative powers, is not to be accepted at face-value by the Courts themselves. In other words, from the Privy Council's perspective, a mere declaration by the Crown concerning native title matters is no longer binding on the Courts, as Prendergast CJ had assumed in Wi Parata. Rather, the Privy Council implied, all matters involving native title and the Crown were now justiciable within the Courts. With this claim, a significant remnant of Wi Parata, on which the Privy Council had reserved judgment in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, was overturned. From the Privy Council's perspective, the Crown could no longer assert prerogative powers over native title to exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts. It is this partiality which, I believe, reflects a "colonial consciousness" on the part of these judges. I define a "colonial consciousness" as a state of mind imbued with a fundamental commitment to settler interests within colonial society. Because colonial societies are defined, above all, by the appropriation and settlement of new land, these settler interests will be focused on land issues above all. It is the concern of these judges (at one point, as we have seen, openly articulated by Stout CJ) to maintain the stability and security of this settlement process by minimizing the extent to which it could be open to native title challenge, which most reflects this "colonial consciousness". 87 The imputation of this "colonial consciousness" to the judges in Hohepa Wi Neera therefore provides us with some basis for explaining the motivation behind their deliberate attempts to circumvent and minimise the impact of the Privy Council's departure from Wi Parata, and so maintain the authority of that precedent to the facts before them in the present case.
A Broader Backgrounds
But is there any other aspect of the personal backgrounds of either Stout CJ or Williams J which would go further in explaining the presence of this "colonial consciousness", and therefore their willingness to tenaciously defend settler over Maori interests regarding native title? Sir Robert Stout had spent almost all of his adult life in New Zealand, having migrated there from the Shetland Islands in 1864 at the age of nineteen. 88 He spent his working life advancing through the law and politics, beginning as a representative in the Otago Provincial Council in 1872 to eventually become Attorney-General and, in 1884, Premier of New Zealand in the Stout-Vogel Ministry, before accepting the position of Chief Justice in 1899. 89 Indeed, most of his education and experience had been confined to New Zealand and he thoroughly identified with its interests. 90 Yet it is evident that Sir Robert identified New Zealand interests very much with settler interests. His political position, for all of his adult life, was one which divided between a liberal and a radical point of view, in the nineteenth century sense of both those terms. 91 That is, he was 89 See Dunn and Richardson, above n 88 , 68, 96-97, 157-58; Cooke, above, n 4, 45.
90 As Dunn and Richardson state: "For all his adult life his home had been a small colonial outpost, cut off by its remoteness from the United Kingdom from full participation in the cross-currents of thought of contemporary Europe. Unlike several of his contemporaries at the New Zealand bar, he had enjoyed no terms at a great university or at one of the Inns of Court in London, no personal association with the outstanding leaders of the legal profession, no experience outside of the country that had been his home for more than thirty-five years." (Dunn and Richardson, above n 88 , 160).
91 Hence for much of the nineteenth century, "liberalism" was a broad church, due to the absence of any definite Labour parties on the left, and so it tended to divide between laizzez faire and progressive or even radical positions. Ironically, Stout straddled both. So for instance, he was fundamentally committed to free committed to a wide range of progressive causes, including development, but a development which included the interests of the broadest sections of the population. 92 In this regard, Stout CJ had a profound interest in land settlement issues, and consistently opposed the monopolization of land holdings by large private interests. 93 not see any difference between the "real" interests of Maori and those of small settlers, assuming that both would benefit from a similar model of development. 96 It is in the context of his commitment to "development", albeit one tempered by a radical insistence that it be inclusive of small settler interests, that we can understand Stout CJ's concerns over native title, and in particular, his unwillingness to hold that native title was cognizable within the Courts. 97 He well knew that native title was a basis upon which Maori could challenge the legality of existing Crown titles , and if that were possible (as the Privy Council's judgment in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker seemed to imply) then, in Stout CJ's words, "… no land title in the Colony would be safe." 98 It was not a hostility to Maori interests therefore, but rather a hostility to what threatened Stout CJ's conception of land development, which informed his "colonial consciousness" regarding native title.
Whereas Stout CJ was enrolled for a time as the first student at the University of Otago and later became a lecturer in law there, Sir Joshua Williams was a product of the English public school system and Cambridge. 99 Like Stout CJ, he emigrated to New Zealand as a young man, and became very early involved in local politics, becoming a member of the Provincial Council and eventually 96 This tendency to identify Maori and settler interests can be seen in the terms of reference of the Commission, which was concerned to "…. investigate which areas of Native land were 'unoccupied or not profitably occupied' and 'how such lands can best be utilized and settled in the interests of the native owners and the public good'." (Robert Stout and Apirana Turupa Ngata "Interim Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Question of Native Lands and Native Land Tenure" [1907] III AJHR G 1, cited in Boast and Others, above n 10, 87). These terms of reference themselves indicate the extent to which "profit" and "development" would inevitably be defined in European terms. As Dunn and Richardson state: "In many respects the most significant feature of the commission's reports was the emphasis on the importance of encouraging and training the Maoris to settle their own lands efficiently. The commission recommended that the education of Maoris should be given an agricultural bias, that model farms should be established and that the government should provide instructors to advise upon farm and stock management." (Dunn and Richardson, above n 88, 174). Provincial Solicitor in the Canterbury district, though never rising to the level of national politics as Stout CJ did. 100 Like Stout CJ, he also took an interest in land administration, being appointed a District Land Registrar, and also Registrar General of Lands, in the Canterbury region in 1871, before being appointed a judge of the Supreme Court in 1875. 101 By the time of Hohepa Wi Neera, Williams J. had thoroughly identified himself with a commitment to the Wi Parata precedent. He was a member of the Court of Appeal Bench which brought down the original Nireaha Tamaki decision in 1894, and which had upheld the Wi Parata precedent as essential to the "security of all titles in the country". 102 As we have seen, it was this judgment which was subsequently overruled by the Privy Council in 1901. He also delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of The Solicitor-General v The Bishop of Wellington which, in obiter dicta, once again suggested that native title matters were entirely a matter for the prerogative of the Crown. 103 Again, as we have seen, this obiter dicta was the subject of scathing criticism by the Privy Council, which in turn led to the Court of Appeal's protest in 1903. 104 During the course of this Protest, Williams J. once again defended the Wi Parata precedent as the authoritative precedent on native title within New Zealand law, stating: 105 It has always been held that any transactions between the Crown and the Natives relating to their title by occupancy were a matter for the Executive Government, and one into which the Court had no jurisdiction to inquire. As was laid down in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington: 'Transactions with the Natives for the cession of their title to the Crown are to be regarded as acts of State, and therefore are not examinable in any Court' … We considered, as every authority justified us in considering, that the root of all title was in the Crown. What the rights of any prior Native occupiers might be, or whether While Williams J's statement was certainly an accurate articulation of the Wi Parata precedent, his claim that "every authority" justified the Court of Appeal in holding to this precedent was in fact less than accurate. 106 There were two early native title cases in New Zealand which preceded Wi Parata and which held, contrary to the later judgment, that native title was cognizable within municipal courts. 107 Williams J's willingness to overlook these cases is similar to Stout CJ's 106 Williams J also made another claim in his protest concerning the unanimity of authority on native title in New Zealand when, again discussing the Court of Appeal's judgment in Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, he states: "Whether, however, we were right or wrong, there was certainly an unbroken current of authority … that the Native occupiers had no right to their land cognizable in a Court of law, and that having no such right themselves they could not transfer any right to others." ("Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 750,Williams J).
107 Hence as early as 1847, the New Zealand Supreme Court brought down a judgment in R v Symonds, during the course of which Chapman J stated: "The intercourse of civilized nations, and especially of Great Britain, with the aboriginal Natives of America and other countries, during the last two centuries, has gradually led to the adoption and affirmation by the Colonial Courts of certain established principles of law applicable to such intercourse. Although these principles may at times have been lost sight of, yet animated by the humane spirit of modern times, our colonial Courts, and the Courts of such of the United States of America as have adopted the common law of England, have invariably affirmed and supported them; so that at this day, a line of judicial decision, the current of legal opinion, and above all, the settled practice of the colonial Governments, have concurred to clothe with certainty and precision what would otherwise have remained vague and unsettled. These principles are not the new creation or invention of the colonial Courts. They flow not from what an American writer has called the 'vice of judicial legislation'. They are in fact to be found among the earliest settled principles of our law; and they are in part deduced from those higher principles, from charters made in conformity with them, acquiesced in even down to the charter of our own Colony; and from the letter of treaties with Native tribes, wherein those principles have been asserted and acted upon." (R v Symonds, above n 58 , 388).
That native title was central to the legal principles that Chapman J refers to in his statement above is made clear later in his judgment when he states: "Whatever may be the opinion of jurists as to the strength or weakness of the Native title, whatsoever may have been the past vague notions of the Natives of this country, whatever may be their present clearer and still growing conception of their dominion over land, it cannot be too solemnly asserted that it is entitled to be respected, that it cannot be extinguished (at least in times of peace) otherwise than by the free consent of the Native occupiers. But for their protection, and for the sake of humanity, the Government is bound to maintain, and the Courts to assert, the Queen's exclusive right to extinguish it. It follows from what has been said, that in solemnly guaranteeing the Native title, and in securing what is called the Queen's pre-emptive right, the Treaty of Waitangi, confirmed by the Charter of the Colony, does not assert either in doctrine or in practice any thing new and unsettled." (R v Symonds, above n 58, 390).
Some twenty-five years later, Arney CJ of the Court of Appeal brought down a similar ruling on native title which equally differed from the later Wi Parata judgment. During the course of this ruling, Arney CJ said: "No doubt there is a sense in which 'Native lands' are not 'Crown lands'. The Crown is bound, both by the common law of England and by its own solemn engagements, to a full recognition of Native proprietary right. Whatever the extent of that right by established native custom appears to be, the Crown is bound to respect it." (In re 'The Lundon and Whitaker Claims Act 1871' (1872) 2 NZCA 41, 49).
In both of these judgments therefore, native title is held to be recognised by common law and so cognisable in the Courts.
tendency to identify at least one of them as being in agreement with Wi Parata. 108 In doing so, both gave a misleading impression that the authority of Wi Parata was indeed buttressed by all extant judicial authority in New Zealand. Such misrepresentation, whether intentional or not, again reflects the agonistic extent to which these judges were willing to go in defence of this precedent. 109
B A "Nationalist" Consciousness?
But is it a "colonial consciousness" which best explains the Court of Appeal's tenacious commitment to Wi Parata, in the face of the Privy Council's departure from that precedent? Or is this tenacity better explained as arising from very different motives -perhaps from a nascent nationalism concerned to encourage New Zealand independence by upholding local precedents against those emanating from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council? Certainly in the wake of the Privy Council's ruling in Wallis v Solicitor General, and the official protest this engendered, Chief Justice Stout was much more willing to articulate a position critical and hostile to the Privy Council. But was it one articulated in nationalist terms -entailing the need for New Zealand autonomy and independence from that imperial body? In the context of the protest, Stout CJ certainly criticised what he saw as the Privy Council's ignorance of New Zealand law. 110 It is on the basis of this alleged ignorance that Stout CJ then felt justified in questioning the continued usefulness of the Privy Council for New Zealand as follows: 111
The matter is really a serious one. A great Imperial judicial tribunal sitting in the capital of the Empire, dispensing justice even to the meanest of British subjects in the uttermost parts of the earth, is a great and noble ideal. But if that tribunal is not acquainted with the laws it is called upon to interpret or administer, it may unconsciously become the worker of injustice. And if such should unfortunately happen, that Imperial spirit that is the true bond of union amongst His Majesty's subjects must be weakened. At present we in New Zealand are, so far as the Privy Council is concerned, in an unfortunate position. It has shown that it knows not our statutes, or our conveyancing terms, or our history. What the remedy may be, or can be, for such a state of things, it is not at present within my province to suggest.
We can see, therefore, that in the context of his protest, Stout CJ was quite willing to criticise what he saw as the deleterious practical effect of Privy Council appeals on New Zealand law. But this practical effect was a product of what he perceived as Privy Council ignorance. At this point, it does not seem that he was openly articulating a position critical of the Privy Council on "nationalist" grounds, as inconsistent with New Zealand independence. However the following year, in an article in the Commonwealth Law Review, Stout CJ did precisely this. He referred to what he believed was the "anomaly" of the Australasian colonies retaining appellate appeals to the Privy Council when they had achieved self-government in the areas of legislation and administration, suggesting that such appeals were inconsistent with such self-government and the independence it implied. 112 Indeed, Stout CJ goes so far as to claim that the retention of such appellate appeals is "illogical": 113
Seeing that the fullest rights of legislation and administration have been granted to the Colonies, it is illogical that the fullest rights of settling legal disputes should not also have been granted to them.
Surely the making of laws, and the administering of Government affairs are as important as the interpreting of the laws we ourselves have made [?] Stout CJ reiterated in this article the problems with the Privy Council which he referred to in his protest -not least its distance and alleged ignorance of much colonial law, and the delay and expense of appeal. 114 Yet the "nationalist" dimension which he added in this article goes further 114 Hence he states: "The present system is often a denial of justice to many litigants on account of delay, cost, and the ignorance of the external Judges of what our laws have been, and are, and of want of acquaintance with our environment." ("Appellate Tribunals for the Colonies", above n 112, 13. See also "Appellate than the protest and, in addition to his claim above that appellate appeals to the Privy Council are inconsistent with self-government, he argues that they are also harmful to the spirit of independence which such self-government is meant to instill: 115
Supposing, however, it were admitted that Appeal Court Judges in Australasia could not be expected to have the ability or learning of the members of the Judicial Committee, is that a reason for maintaining this external tribunal as an ultimate Court of Appeal? Did we ever see a child learning to walk? Its legs and arms were free, not bandaged. It was not always led. It tried, and tried again to go alone, and it had many falls before it succeeded. We cannot expect a young nation to be equal to one which has centuries of civilization behind it, and whose institutions are old and deemed sacred. But is the young nation never to go alone? Is it always to be under tutelage?
And Stout CJ concludes his article on the same note, warning: 116
The psychological effect of dependence on some external power for the performance of our highest duties as citizens of these new nations should … not be lost sight of.
So in his criticisms of the Privy Council in the Commonwealth Law Review, Stout CJ was clearly articulating a position which manifested a distinct concern with New Zealand independence, and the impact of Privy Council appeals on this. But can this same "nationalist" consciousness also explain his willingness over the previous two years to uphold the local native title precedent of Wi Parata in the face of Privy Council rulings departing from it? As we shall see below, there are strong grounds for holding that it cannot.
Within his protest, Williams J also questioned the continuing usefulness of the Privy Council for New Zealand, though again, not in terms of an explicit expression of nationalist consciousness, but 116 "Appellate Tribunals for the Colonies", above n 112, 13. Stout CJ did not see this assertion of Australasian independence, in the form of a colonial break from the Privy Council, as inconsistent with the need for unity of Empire, much discussed at the time. This is because he did not see the Privy Council as a source of that unity. As Stout CJ put it: "The retaining of the Judicial Committee has been urged on the ground that a Court sitting in London as the ultimate Court of Appeal for the Colonies is a 'Link of Empire'. I hope never to see our Empire broken up. It is better for our race and for the world that the Empire should subsist and be powerful and strong. How can it be suggested that a Court sitting in London, determining ten, twenty or thirty cases a year for the Colonies, can keep those Colonies united to the Motherland? Is it not more likely to cause disagreements than to promote peace? If the questions that were relegated to this Central Court were Imperial, and not domestic, much might be said in defence of the argument. No one ventures to suggest that the settling of our domestic concerns in London by legislation or by administration would tend to preserve the unity of the Empire, and if not, how can it be said that the settling of some of our domestic legal matters by a Court will have that tendency?" ("Appellate Tribunals for the Colonies", above n 112, 9 "The Judge's speech is still remembered by those of my generation, because of his picture of the grave and momentous issues involved in the war -the danger to South Africa, and to our prestige in India and the Far East -and his appeal for unity. Amidst resounding cheers, he denounced those who wished to discuss the merits of the war and where the blame for it lay. 'The time for that has past', he cried. 'It may come again; it will come again, when all is over. But now if any one says to you 'But I don't approve of this war', then there is only one answer, 'Sir, you have got to approve of it. (Renewed cheering). When your mother is in trouble, it is your duty to help her, even though she may to some extent have brought the trouble on herself'." (Stewart, above n 100, 82-83). Yet can the articulation of a "nationalist" consciousness in their criticisms of the Privy Council explain the effort to which these Court of Appeal judges went in defending the Wi Parata precedent? I don't think so. Firstly, much of the "nationalist" consciousness articulated above was motivated by the protest, which in turn was motivated by the statements of the Privy Council in Wallis v Solicitor-General. 123 Certainly the protest was as much a defence of the Wi Parata precedent as it was a protest against the injudicious use of language, and aspersions cast upon the Court of Appeal, by the Privy Council. 124 But as we have seen, the Court of Appeal had shown just as much willingness to uphold Wi Parata prior to Wallis and prior to the protest. 125 Indeed, the Court of Appeal's Hohepa Wi Neera judgment was delivered prior to the Privy Council's judgment in Wallis and therefore prior to the protest it engendered, so any "nationalist" spirit arising from the which many distinguished judges were present. I sat between two KC's who questioned me about the incident, and expressed astonishment that we still acquiesced in the practice of appeals to the Privy Council." (Stewart, above n 100, 90). 122 See Scholefied, above n 121, 342; 514.
123 Indeed, any "nationalist" consciousness which the protest engendered seems to be fairly derivative, and parasitical, on a prior "colonial" consciousness. In other words, it seems that it was the frustrations which their "colonial" consciousness experienced, in the face of the threats to the Wi Parata precedents, which led the Court of Appeal judges to express wider "nationalist" sentiments suggesting a need for greater independence from the Privy Council. However whether the protest engendered, or indeed reflected, a "colonial" or "nationalist" consciousness (and I suggest it reflected the former much more than the latter) it clearly did not reflect a belief on the part of New Zealand lawyers that they were "umbilically connected both historically and doctrinally to the British Constitution" 126 But not a threat to the "nationalist" independence of New Zealand. Rather, a threat to the stability and security of land settlement in that country. In other words, if any "consciousness" informed the Court of Appeal's commitment to Wi Parata, and the tenacity it displayed in its defence in the wake of the Privy Council's rulings, it was a colonial and not a nationalist consciousness.
D The 1912 Case
Indeed, further evidence that it was not a "nationalist" concern with New Zealand independence which informed the Court of Appeal's desire to defend local precedents on native title against the Privy Council, is provided by the Court of Appeal's later judgment on native title in the 1912 case of Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General. 127 Here, the Court of Appeal swung full circle and ultimately affirmed what had been the Privy Council's position on native title in Nireaha Tamaki and Wallis v Solicitor-General -that contrary to Wi Parata, native title did fall within the jurisdiction of the Courts and the Crown could be subject to that jurisdiction. 128 The Court of Appeal engaged in this about-face despite the fact that, in the wake of the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker and Wallis v Solicitor-General, the New Zealand Parliament had passed a series of statutes expressly designed to give statutory enforcement to the Wi Parata precedent, thereby rendering the Privy Council's common law judgments to the contrary irrelevant as a determination of New Zealand law. 129 Indeed, it was on the basis of one of these statutes (the Native Land Act 1909) that Stout CJ, in Tamihana Korokai, was able to hold that the Crown was subject to judicial determination on native title. This 1912 case involved a native title claim against the Crown to the bed of Lake Rotorua, once again raising the question of whether the municipal courts had the authority to bind the Crown over to the Native Land Court for a determination of the claim. 130 Sections 84 and 85 of the Native Land Act 1909 had expressly tried to uphold the Wi Parata precedent that the Crown was not subject to the determination of the Courts on native title. Section 84 stated: 131
Save so far as otherwise expressly provided in any other Act the Native customary title to land shall not be available or enforceable as against His Majesty the King by any proceedings in any Court or in any other manner.
However prior to the passing of the Native Land Act 1909, the parties to the Tamihana Korokai case had reached an agreement whereby the Solicitor-General agreed to waive "… any objection or defence which might be based on the provisions of section 84 of that Act … except in so far as these provisions may be held to be merely declaratory of the law as existing before the passing of the said Act." 132 Consequently, the 1912 native title case against the Crown was able to go ahead, despite the strictures of s 84. 130 See Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 323. Indeed Stout CJ reduced the matters raised in this case to this issue alone, stating: "The point in dispute between the parties is a narrow one. The plaintiff contends that he has a statutory right to go to the Native Land Court claiming under the Native Land Act a freehold title [in return for his alleged native title]. The Solicitor-General contends that if he, as SolictorGeneral, says the land -that is, the bed of Lake Rotorua -is Crown land, that concludes the matter, and the Native Land Court cannot proceed to make any inquiries as to whether the land is Native customary land. That is the matter in contention, and it appears to me that it is the only question that this Court has at present to decide." (Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 338 Stout CJ).
131 Native Land Act 1909, s 84.
132 Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 326 (emphasis added). While the Solicitor-General in Tamihana Korokai agreed to waive any defence based on section 84 of the Native Land Act 1909, nevertheless in his statement to the Court, the Solicitor-General (in person) still relied on the Wi Parata precedent as the basis of the Crown's defence. He stated: "The nature of Native customary title has been considered in many cases … and we ask the Court to confirm and ratify the principle acted on in those cases. That principle is -Native title is not available in any manner and for any purpose against the Crown. As against the Crown it is not a legal title at all." (Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 331 Solicitor-General). The Solicitor-General then concluded by asserting the Crown's right to determine native Section 85 of the Native Land Act 1909 nevertheless continued in the spirit of Wi Parata by statutorily enforcing Prendergast CJ's claim that a mere declaration of the Crown concerning native title is binding on the Courts: 133 A Proclamation by the Governor that any land vested in His Majesty the King is free from the Native customary title shall in all Courts and in all proceedings be accepted as conclusive proof of the fact so proclaimed.
In Tamihana Korokai, the Solicitor-General then gave evidence to the Crown upholding this principle that the declaration of the Crown was sufficient to nullify all native title claims against the Crown, stating: 134 … Native title is not available in any manner and for any purpose against the Crown. As against the Crown it is not a legal title at all. If, therefore, any dispute exists as to whether the land is native customary land or Crown land the ipse dixit of the Crown is conclusive and the question cannot be The Solicitor-General however, apparently believed that his own ipse dixit, as the Law Officer of the Crown, was sufficient to determine the matter for the Crown. In other words, it appears from the record of the case that the Solicitor-General was asserting that his declaration that the land in question was Crown land, free from native title, would (as representative of the Crown in this title claims by mere declaration: "The conclusiveness of a claim by the Crown extends to all cases, whether the claim is based on cession, abandonment, confiscation, or any other ground, and the claim is not examinable by this Court." (Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 334-35 Solicitor-General).
133 Native Land Act 1909, s 85. The Act therefore guaranteed the security of all Crown grants and other Crown titles from native title challenge. As section 86 states: "No Crown grant, Crown lease, or other alienation or disposition of land by the Crown, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall in any Court or in any proceedings be questioned or invalidated or in any manner affected by reason of the fact that the Native customary title to that land has not been duly extinguished." (Native Land Act 1909, s 86). However the Native Land Act 1909 did not nullify the legal possibility of native title itself, which would have produced a terra nullius outcome. Rather, native title was recognised within the statute. The statute simply held that native title was not effective against the Crown in any instance where the Crown decided to refuse native title claims (see s 85). This recognition of native title is evident in section 90 of the Act, which followed previous Acts in reserving to the Native Land Court the " … exclusive jurisdiction to investigate the title to customary land, and to determine the relative interests of the owners thereof." (Native Land Act 1909, s 90).
be binding on the Court, leaving it no jurisdiction to interfere. 139 It was this point of view which was so resoundingly rejected by the Privy Council in Wallis v Solicitor-General. 140 Hence we see the extent to which Stout CJ, and his concurring judges in the 1912 case, had moved to embrace the Privy Council position on native title which they had so thoroughly criticised and evaded only nine years before.
Stout CJ's rejection of the Solicitor-General's claim above meant that he was then able to uphold the plaintiff's native title claim against the Crown, despite the fact that this was clearly contrary to the intentions of the 1909 Act. In denying the authority of the Solicitor-General to determine the issue of native title merely by his own declaration, Stout CJ insisted that there were only a specified number of ways that native title claims against the Crown could be "nullified", thereby preventing any further investigation into the native title: 141
There are, in my opinion, only three things that can prevent the Native Land Court entering on an inquiry as to such customary title -1, a Proclamation of the Governor under a statute, such as has been provided in many Acts, and is so provided in section 85 of the Native Land Act, 1909; 2, a prohibition by the Governor under section 100 of the Native Land Act, 1909; 3, proof that the land has been ceded by the true owners, or that a Crown grant has been issued.
Given that none of these grounds were established by the Crown in the case, Stout CJ concluded that there was not sufficient proof to determine that the native title to the bed of Lake Rotorua, if it existed, had been extinguished. Consequently, Stout CJ ruled that the claimants had a right to take their case to the Native Land Court to determine the status of the native title against the Crown. Such a conclusion is rather ironic, given that it uses the Native Land Act 1909 to reach conclusions contrary to the intentions of the Act itself. Stout CJ insisted that the Act established strict procedures for the extinguishment of native title claims by the Crown, and then argued that because the Crown has not abided by these procedures in the present case, native title claims could be instituted against the Crown in the Native Land Court -the very outcome the Act was designed to avoid. Hence Stout CJ concluded as follows: 142
What the customary title to the bed of Lake Rotorua may be must be considered and determined by the But what does the 1912 case tell us of the reasons behind the Court of Appeal's tenacious defence of the Wi Parata precedent a decade before? Most of all, I think, it tells us that this defence could not have been informed by a "nationalist" desire to uphold local against imperial precedents. If such a desire was behind this defence, then one must assume that this desire would be even more prevalent in 1912 than in 1902-03, because New Zealand would have had a further nine years to grow towards national maturity. And yet in 1912, the Court of Appeal moved in the opposite direction, to embrace the Privy Council precedents they had rejected a decade before. Consequently, it seems, the only consciousness which informed the Court of Appeal in its defence of Wi Parata was a "colonial" one -a desire to preserve what it thought was necessary for the stability and security of the New Zealand settlement process. Further, it appears that the anxiety and concern over this stability and security had sufficiently subsided by 1912 for the Court of Appeal to openly accept a Privy Council position which, only a decade before, they saw as a fundamental threat to this process. Consequently, far from the growth of a "nationalist" consciousness explaining this shift on native title by the Court of Appeal, between 1902 and 1912, it is best explained by a subsidence of "colonial" consciousness over this same period. At the turn of the century it defined that which it believed had to be defended against an imperial court, for the sake of maintaining stability and security of land settlement in New Zealand. And a decade later, it defined that which it had to leave behind if it were to shed that colonial consciousness, heal the breach with the Privy Council, and so move to a more impartial position concerning Maori and Pakeha differences over land settlement in New Zealand.
VIII CONCLUSION

